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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE SHOULD HAVE BARRED 
BUSHMAN'S CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AFTER HE HAD BEEN 
FINED BY THE STIPULATION AND CONSENT ORDER 
The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the "imposition of multiple criminal 
punishments for the same offense[.]" Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 
488, 493, 139 L.Ed2d 450 (1997). The inquiry into whether or not a penalty is civil or 
criminal has two levels. "First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in 
establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a 
preference for one label or the other." United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248, 100 
S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (internal citations omitted). "Second, where 
Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further 
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that 
intention." Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (reaffirmed in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 
99)). Here, Bushman asserts that the Utah Legislature did not intend to make the fines 
authorized by Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-20 a civil sanction and thus the fines imposed 
upon Bushman constitute criminal punishment preceding the criminal charges underlying 
this case. Bushman also asserts that if this Court finds through implication that the 
legislature intended the fines to be a civil sanction that the fines serve no remedial or civil 
purpose and are therefore punitive and criminal in purpose and effect. 
A. The legislature did not explicitly or implicitly express an intent to make the 
fines imposed under § 61-1-20 a civil penalty. 
The legislature was not explicit in its intent to make the punishment civil. Nothing 
on the face of the statute expresses the legislature's intent to make the fines authorized in 
Utah Code Annotated § 61-1-20 a civil sanction as opposed to punitive criminal 
punishment. In response to this lack of express intent the State has argued that such 
intent may be implied from the nature of the authorization to impose the fine. See 
Appellee's Brief at 16 ("The legislature's authorization of administratively imposed 
sanctions demonstrates that those sanctions are civil in nature"). The State cites Hudson 
in support of the proposition that "[t]hat such authority was conferred upon 
administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that [the Utah legislature] intended to 
provide for a civil sanction." Appellee's Brief at 16 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 105). 
However, Bushman asserts that the State has used Hudson loosely and that case should 
be distinguished from the facts of this case. 
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A clear distinction can be drawn from the implicit intent found by the United States 
Supreme Court in Hudson and the way the State argues this Court should find implicit 
intent to make the money penalties civil in this case. In Hudson the statues that provided 
for the "imposition of monetary penalties for violations of [banking regulations], 
expressly provide that such penalties are 'civil.'" Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 103. Because the 
monetary sanctions were explicitly intended to be civil the Court needed only determine 
whether the monetary penalties were "so punitive in form and effect as to render them 
criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary." Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (citing 
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2148, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 
(1996)). No such explicit intention is present in this case so this Court is obliged to first 
determine whether the monetary sanctions imposed on Bushman were first intended to be 
civil in nature before examining whether or not a civil sanction is rendered criminal by its 
form and effect. 
The language quoted by the State, relating to the legislature's implied intentions 
based on the fact that it authorized an administrative agency to impose sanctions, is 
misplaced. See Appellee's Brief at 16 {citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103). The State uses 
the language to insinuate that an implied intention to make fines a civil sanction, 
however, in Hudson, the Court found an implied intention only in the case of the 
administrative agency's power of debarment in the banking industry and not the 
monetary fines. Debarment is an administrative function, while monetary fines are 
unrelated to the administrative agency's inherent power over the market. Bushman 
asserts that, in Hudson, had Congress not been explicit with regard to its intent for the 
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monetary penalties to be civil the fact that an administrative agency was authorized to 
impose them would not be sufficient to deem it impliedly civil. Otherwise the it seems 
any power or sanction given an agency would be impliedly civil rendering the first prong 
useless. 
An example of implied intent may be found in Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 
1249 (10th Cir. 2000), where the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found a law requiring 
registration of sex offenders to be established as a civil remedy and not a criminal 
punishment "from the simple fact that the legislature placed the statute in the civil code 
as opposed to the criminal code." The Court of Appeals found that the intent of the 
legislature was demonstrated both by the placement in the civil code and the fact that the 
statute promoted a remedial measure to an administrative problem (investigating and 
apprehending offenders in sex-related crimes). However, this case is not so simple. Here 
the fact that the monetary fines found in § 61-1-20 are located in the 'civil code' as 
opposed to the 'criminal code' (presumably within § 76) is not persuasive due to the 
obvious fact that the criminal charges brought against Bushman in this case were based 
on a crime and punishment found outside the criminal code in § 61-1-21. The placement 
of the monetary fine in § 61-1-20 outside the criminal code does not demonstrates an 
intent to make it civil any more than the placement of § 61-1-21 outside the criminal code 
demonstrates an intent to make the criminal penalties a civil remedy. 
As for remedial effect, Bushman reasserts that unlike Femedeer, the fines arising 
from § 61-1-20 have no remedial purpose other that to punish those involved in the 
conduct the legislature sought to prohibit. The fines do not represent money owed by an 
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offender to reimburse the State for damages to State property or to pay for funds 
expended by the State in enforcing § 61-1-1. The imposition of the fine is not designed 
to allow the agency to investigate or apprehend offenders of securities fraud. The fines 
are not motivated by concerns of administrative convenience. See Femedeer, 227 F.3d 
1244, 1249. The fines found in § 61-1-20 are designed to punish an offender and to deter 
other would-be offenders. These purposes are not remedial and thus, unlike Femedeer, 
do not demonstrate an implied intention to make the sanction civil. 
B. Even if this Court finds an implicit legislative intent that fines under § 61-1-20 
be considered civil the fines imposed on Bushman should be held to be a 
criminal punishment according to the Kennedy factors. 
"Even in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a 
civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to transform] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy 
into a criminal penalty." Hudson, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (internal quotations omitted). 
Bushman asserts that if the legislature's intention to make the fines a civil penalty is 
implied the actual purpose and effect of the fine is a punitive and criminal punishment for 
Double Jeopardy purposes. 
The United States Supreme Court laid out seven key factors in determining whether 
a legislatively created sanction is civil or criminal in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1962). The Court suggested that 
"[ajbsent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute, 
these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face." Kennedy, 372 U.S. 
144,169. A reviewing court should ask "[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative 
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disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether 
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the 
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which 
it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned[.]" Id. at 168-69. 
The State has alleged that the fines imposed on Bushman did not "'involve an 
affirmative disability or restraint' - 'certainly nothing approaching the infamous 
punishment of imprisonment."5 Appellee's Brief at 13 (quoting Hudson at 104) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). In Hudson, the fine is not considered an affirmative 
disability or restraint but the fine was imposed only "[a]fter taking into account the size 
of the financial resources and the good faith of [petitioners], the gravity of the 
violations[.]" Id, at 97. Certainly a monetary fine may be considered as debilitative as 
imprisonment and therefore criminal depending on the circumstances. The Court in 
Hudson found, under the circumstances, the fines imposed were not an affirmative 
disability or restraint. Here, Bushman urges this Court to find, under the circumstances, 
the fines imposed upon him by the Division of Securities were, due to the circumstances, 
akin to criminal sanctions. 
In its brief the State has argued that "neither money penalties nor debarment has 
historically been viewed as a punishment." Appellee's Brief at 13 (quoting Hudson at 
104). However the statement in Hudson deals with monetary penalties that have a 
remedial character based on the government's expenses resulting from the offender's 
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conduct. See Hudson at 97 (defendant issued illegal loans that contributed to the failure 
of federally insured banks); see also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401, 58 S.Ct. 
630, 634, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938) (fines levied upon fraudulent taxpayer found civil because 
it acted as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government 
for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the fraud). When fines 
are imposed with a remedial purpose they have not been traditionally seen as punishment, 
however, when fines are focused on retribution for the commission of conduct, for 
example a crime, then a fine is a commonly accepted form of punishment. Bushman 
argues that in this case the fine imposed upon him at the time of the Consent Order was 
not remedial but was merely a punishment for his conduct relevant to §61-1-1. 
The third factor to consider is whether the penalty comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter. Section 61-1-1 requires that the unlawful act of fraud requires either 
an intent to defraud, mislead, or deceive. Section 61-1-20 then simply authorizes the 
director to penalize anyone who has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in an act 
or practice constituting a violation of this chapter, including § 61-1-1. Therefore the 
monetary fines authorized in § 61-1-20 come into play only upon a finding of scienter. 
Just as with traditional crimes, securities fraud as defined by title 61, is a crime that 
requires a mens rea element. In fact, Bushman asserts that there is no significant 
difference between the scienter requirements of §§ 61-1-20 and 61-1-21. 
The next factor is whether the penalty's operation will promote the traditional aims 
of punishment - retribution and deterrence. Not only do the fines authorized by § 61-1-20 
promote retribution and deterrence, but Bushman asserts that these are the only two 
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purposes served by the fines. As mentioned above, there are no corresponding 
government costs to repay; the fines are in addition to restitution so they do not serve to 
make injured parties whole. There is no remedial purpose to the fines authorized in § 61-
1-20. The State claims that the fines were remedial because they encouraged Bushman to 
pay restitution in a timely manner, however only the reduction in the fines and not the 
fines themselves. The fact that the fines may be reduced upon Bushman's timely 
repayment of his debts does not give the fines as a whole a remedial purpose. The 
purpose of the reduction is arguably remedial but the fines were punishment for a 
violation of §61-1-1. Because the fines operate to promote retribution and deterrence 
they are more like a traditional criminal punishment than a civil penalty. 
The next factor is whether the behavior to which the fine applies is already a crime. 
The Court in Kennedy cites Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562, 42 S.Ct. 549, 551, 66 
L.Ed. 1061 (1922), as an example of this factor. In Lipke the Court found that where 
"evidence of crime... is essential to assessment [of the questionable tax]... [i]t lacks all 
the ordinary characteristics of a tax, whose primary function is to provide for the support 
of the government [whereas the tax in question] clearly involves the idea of punishment 
for infraction of the law-the definite function of a penalty." Lipke, 259 U.S. 557, 562. See 
also United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295, 56 S.Ct. 223, 227, 80 L.Ed 233 
(1935) ("The condition of the imposition is the commission of a crime. This, together 
with the amount of the tax, is again significant of penal and prohibitory intent rather than 
the gathering of revenue."). Analogously, the fines in § 61-1-20 require the same 
evidence as do the felonies found in § 61-1-21. The elements of the crimes in § 61-1-21 
8 
and the conduct required for the fines in § 61-1-20 are the same. According to this factor 
the fine is not a civil penalty at all but a criminal punishment. 
The final factor is whether an alternative purpose to which the penalty may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it and whether it appears excessive in relation to 
the alternative purpose assigned. The Court in Kennedy again cites Lipke as an example 
in this factor. In Lipke the monetary punishment was called a tax "in an act primarily 
designed to define and suppress crime[.]"The Court found that this alleged alternative 
purpose could not overcome the punitive nature of the imposition. See also United States 
v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572, 51 S.Ct. 278, 280, 75 L.Ed. 551 (1931) ("if an exaction 
be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted to a tax by the simple expedient of calling it 
such... [it is] a penalty involving the idea of punishment for infraction of the law"). Here 
there is no explicit alternative purpose to which the fine may be connected. As the State 
put it the statutes create "sanctions for securities violations and also define[] criminal 
offenses based on such violations." Appellee's Brief at 15. The alternative purpose 
argued by the State, "encouraging Defendant's repaying of his victims in a timely 
manner[,]" is only a secondary or If the trial court had ordered that a fine will arise if 
Bushman failed to repay his debts within a certain time then the fine would arguably be 
remedial, however the imposition of the fine was connected with the violation of the 
securities law as punishment for that conduct and the reduction of the fine after the fact 
was merely incidentally related to the purpose of aiding the victim's recovery. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the fine imposed upon Bushman constituted a criminal punishment for the 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the trial court should have dismissed the 
criminal charges underlying this appeal. Bushman therefore requests this Court to 
reverse his conviction and sentence based on his conditional plea and remand the case to 
the District Court where his motion to dismiss should be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of December, 2009. 
Margaret rtlindsay 
Douglas J. Thompson 
Counsel for Appellant 
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